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Where will the Dutch judicial system be in 2015? One of us answered a similar type of 
question elsewhere with a sketch of two frightening scenarios.* In the first scenario the 
judicial system will have insufficiently adapted itself to its surroundings. The judicial system 
will become more intensively involved in a decreasing amount of cases that gradually carry 
less weight.  The judicial system, as a social phenomenon, will be marginalized even though 
the traditional standards of constitutional legitimacy and professionalism of the administration 
of justice are kept up. Interesting or big cases will be handled outside the judiciary by special 
courts or through arbitration, mediation or other forms of “alternative dispute resolution” 
(ADR). The large amount of bulk cases will be transferred to other legal areas or authorities 
where the involvement of the judge will decrease (for example the Mulderizing of criminal 
cases, or settlement by the Public Prosecutor). With the decrease in jurisdiction the authority 
of the judicial system will decline and eventually prise itself out of the market. In the second 
frightening scenario the judicial system will have adapted itself too much to its surroundings. 
Van Gunsteren once sketched a picture of the court as a dynamic centre for settling conflicts, 
a place where the experts fall over each other with seminars, workshops, courses, and new 
methods. Instead of settling conflicts they get copied within the judicial organization itself.† 
The judicial system, with its well-meaning efforts at being responsive, will have distanced 
itself from its core duties: settling disputes through binding judgments. While the judicial 
system has lost touch with its surroundings in the first scenario, it has lost its own self in the 
second scenario. 
 
The Dutch judicial system’s domain in 2015, to be understood as “the size (number of court 
pleadings) of the judicial system and the composition of the legal fields within the judicial 
system” is the central theme of this paper, where the basis for binding decisions in the form of 
enforceable judgments play a pivotal role. What are the most relevant social tendencies that 
can influence the judicial system’s domain in the medium-term? What are the possible effects, 
of the tendencies sketched, on the components of legal fields? These questions are central 
here. While it is possible to take a sociological approach to these questions, we are going to 
concentrate on the development of jurisprudence. However, we must immediately point out 
that a strict division between these two approaches is not possible. In our attempt to get a 
view of the development of the judicial system’s domain we have come upon a mine of 
influences that sometimes support and sometimes contradict each other. It transpired that it 
was just as complicated to indicate in which legal fields the effects manifested themselves. 
For these reasons it is good to record up front a disclaimer that it is not possible to fully 
predict the development of the judicial domain. What we can do is sketch some trends and 
perspectives and give some figures that result in a view of the judicial domain and deliver a 
few possible scenarios for its development. 
 
The research’s focus is on the development of the judicial domain in the Netherlands. In order 
to describe the influences in this context and mark out some plausible future scenarios, we 
have sought to evaluate the role of courts in the Dutch legal system in the light of models of 
analysis developed in American academic writing on this subject. It is true that this choice of 
research method demands to be used with precaution, the differences between Dutch and 
                                                          
* M.A. Loth, ‘Rechtspraak en mediation; een liaison dangereuse?’, in: A.F.M. Brenninkmeijer (ed.), De 
taakopvatting van de rechter, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2003, p. 39. 
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American legal culture being considerable.‡ The way in which specificities of the legal 
culture affect issues of judicial organization in each of the legal systems has to be taken into 
account when applying American models to the Dutch situation. Bearing in mind this 
restriction, we think that the analysis of the Dutch legal system in the proposed frame of 
reference can yield some valuable results for the deliberation on policies for the Dutch 
judicial organization in the years to come. In the light of the growing academic interest for the 
comparative analysis of questions of judicial organization§, the analysis may also offer some 
useful starting points for the evaluation of developments in other (European) legal systems.  
 
The following subjects will be handled one after the other in the text below. First a distinction 
will be made between two different paradigms in thinking and speaking about the judicial 
system’s domain. These will dominate the rest of the argument: a quantitative paradigm 
(description), and a qualitative (normative) paradigm (par. 2). Following this, attention will be 
given to the quantitative paradigm, in the first place by referring to relevant figures (par. 3.1), 
and further by the demarcation of the judicial system’s domain from other state powers, other 
legal orders, other forms of conflict solving, the needs of the citizens, and internal domain 
divisions (par. 3.2).  Further the judicial system’s domain will be approached from the second 
paradigm by examining the question of the judicial system’s social role in terms of the 
influence of the judge and the impact of his judgments. That results in an exploration of the 
possible effects: domain expansion in width, domain expansion in depth, domain reduction in 
width and domain reduction in depth (par. 4). Finally the two paradigms will be connected to 
each other and on the basis of this a few scenarios on the development of the judicial system’s 
domain will be sketched. What do the developments sketched in par. 3 mean for the possible 
effects given in par. 4? In par. 5, as an answer to this question, three possible scenarios for the 
development of the Dutch judicial domain will be sketched. A few conclusions will round off 
this investigation (par. 6). 
 
                                                          
‡ Concerning the specificities of the Dutch legal culture, see E. Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The 
Netherlands Compared to Neighboring Germany’, American Journal of Comparative Law 1998, p. 1-41. 
§ In the European context, see M. Fabri, P.M. Langbroek & H. Pauliat (eds.), The administration of justice in 
Europe: Towards the development of quality standards, Bologna: Lo Scarabeo 2003; M. Fabri, J.-P. Jean, P.M. 
Langbroek & H. Pauliat (eds.), L’administration de la justice en Europe et l’évaluation de sa qualité, Paris: 
Montchrestien 2005. See also the projects of the Council of Europe’s Committee on the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ), http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcooperation/cepej/. 
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2. Two paradigms 
 
Before we begin describing the judicial system’s domain it is a good idea to first justify the 
scope of such a description. For this purpose it is useful to make a distinction between two 
paradigms that control the thinking and writing on the judicial system’s domain. The question 
presented in this vision paper is the product of a way of thinking; the judicial system’s domain 
is approached as the scope and demarcation of the judge’s work terrain, both in number of 
cases as well as types of cases. For obvious reasons we call this the quantitative or descriptive 
paradigm; the judicial system’s domain is a factual, even quantifiable subject that can more or 
less be objectively described. A view-point on the judicial system – called the “problem 
solving conception” by David Luban – where the judicial system is pragmatically seen as a 
duty of the government to solve conflicts acts as a foundation to this paradigm.** It is only a 
short step from this vision to the conclusion that the judicial system is there to solve conflicts 
that cannot otherwise be solved in society. This is the new liberal view of minimal 
government and maximum free-market thinking, everything at the service of the citizen’s 
freedom.  The personal responsibility of the citizen is emphasized and the judicial system gets 
a subsidiary role. The most important extra significance of the judicial system compared to all 
the other forms of solving conflicts is that it – as a product of the government’s monopoly on 
violence – can make the solution to conflicts binding. Judicial thinking and conduct is looked 
upon as rather instrumental in this way: it is at the service of conflict solving. The aim of the 
judge’s intervention between disputing parties is to end the conflict and with that return the 
peace between them.  
 
The judicial system’s domain in the second paradigm is not seen so much as a demarcated 
work terrain, but rather as a function or role that it fulfills in society. Considering that that is a 
qualitative or even normative fact – in the sense that every description is based on values – we 
will refer to it further as the qualitative or normative paradigm. In this vision - called the 
“public life conception” by Luban – the judicial system is seen as a necessary result to 
political decision-making in society and in this way an indispensable link in the public debate. 
The judicial system has in this communal idea –above its conflict solving function– a 
community forming function, through its contribution to the development of public values and 
with that to the self-image of a political society. The freedom of the citizens is not confined to 
the private sphere or the free-market but exists in the self-realization of the individual citizen 
in that political community. The most important additional value of the judicial system is not 
only that it facilitates continuation with the strong arm of the law, but also that it contributes 
through law making to the legal order. Every conflict is seen, in principle, as a possibility to 
develop the law further. The focus here is not the tackling of rights or interests, but a value-
orientated interpretation of the conflict. Legal thought and action stands in this approach 
primarily as a recovery sign to the consensus in the political community of its public ideals.†† 
The function of the judge can be typified as a mediating function; not only between the 
disputing parties, but also between the parties and the community, and with that between a 
diversity of interests, roles and values that typifies a plural society.‡‡  
 
                                                          
** D. Luban, ‘Settlements and the erosion of the public realm’, The Georgetown Law Journal 1995, p. 2619-
2662. 
†† P. Ricoeur, The just, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000, p. 127-133. 
‡‡ S. Hampshire, Justice is conflict, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2000, and A.M. Hol & 
M.A. Loth, ‘Iudex mediator, naar een herwaardering van de juridische professie’, Rechtsfilosofie en 
Rechtstheorie 2001, p. 9-57. 
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Both of these paradigms lead to a better understanding of the scenarios for the Dutch judicial 
system out of Justitie over morgen II.§§ In order to show this it is worthwhile to first 
summarize shortly the different scenarios for the judicial system’s domain. From two 
variables – the demand for security and the degree of internationalization – four scenarios will 
be distinguished: Forza Europa (big demand for security, further internationalization), 
Netherlands Afraid (big demand for security, backlash from the internationalization), The 
European Way (limited demand for security, further internationalization), Together.nl (limited 
demand for security, limited internationalization). Each of these scenarios has consequences 
for the judicial domain. 
 
(i) Forza Europa: leads to an extension of the judicial system across the board. The 
increased demand for security and the call for heavier punishments lead to more 
(repressive) criminal law. The decrease in willingness to take risks stimulates the 
claim culture and pursuance of lawsuits and contributes, in this way, to a growth in 
civil law adjudication. Finally the domain of the administrative law judge also 
shows a tendency to expand because of, amongst other things, the transfer of parts 
of the overloaded criminal law workload to administrative law.  
(ii) Netherlands Afraid: also leads to an expansion of the judicial domain. The greater 
demand for security here also leads to more (repressive) criminal law. Moreover,  
the progressive demand for lawsuits and the claim culture pressurizes civil law. 
Administrative law does not grow; through a defensive administration the 
expected growth in demand for the administrative judge does not materialize. 
(iii) The European Way: primarily results in the judicial system becoming more 
European, with double consequences: on the one hand a domain expansion with 
European law for the national judge, and on the other hand a domain loss to the 
European judges (the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights) for the national judicial system. 
(iv) Together.nl: more social control and more peaceful solutions to conflicts leads to a 
domain decrease for the judicial system (and also to a “numbing of the judicial 
system”), with perhaps the aliens department as an exception (greater pressure on 
the national borders through failing European immigration policy).   
 
These scenarios need to be analyzed in terms of both paradigms. Characteristic of the first two 
mentioned scenarios is the strife towards greater security, which is to say greater emphasis on 
the instrumentation and responsiveness of the law. The law wants to give an answer to the 
social call for more security (responsiveness) and offers suitable means (instrumentation) 
towards reaching this goal, in one scenario from international sources (Forza Europa), and in 
the other one from national sources (Netherlands Afraid).  In both cases the judicial system is 
faced with a domain expansion and consequently capacity problems. Society as a whole is 
confronted with law that is more repressive (especially criminal law). There is a fine line that 
divides the promise of responsive law from the risk of repressive law, just as Nonet and 
Selznick have already shown.*** Law offers the promise of more security, but implies at the 
same time the risk of returning to repressive law. These scenarios can be analyzed excellently 
in the quantitative, descriptive paradigm of the judicial system’s domain. The development in 
the last two scenarios is completely different. It is not so much the ambition for a greater 
social role that has priority, but an ambition to re-evaluate the rule of law, with great emphasis 
on the legal protection of the citizen and the legal values that make-up the legal order. The 
                                                          
§§ Ministry of Justitie, Direction AJS, January 2006. 
*** P. Nonet & P. Selznick, Law and society in transition; toward responsive law, New York: Harper & Row 
1978, p. 115-119. 
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legal order is seen as the normative structure of society. There is no mention of a repressive 
society, but of a normative society. The judge’s task is not primarily to guarantee more 
security, but to provide a contribution to the shaping of the law. In these scenarios that is 
precisely the judicial system’s domain, in a more qualitative sense of the word. These 
developments can therefore be better analyzed in terms of the qualitative, normative paradigm 
of the judicial system’s domain. When we speak of a domain decrease – like in the report 
Justitie over Morgen II – we do not do it complete justice. It is true that in quantitative terms 
there is a domain decrease, but in qualitative terms the role of the judicial system has not 
diminished. The judicial system’s domain here has neither grown nor decreased, but has a 
new definition; not in terms of the work terrain’s size, but in terms of the nature of the 
contribution to the rule of law. The conclusion is therefore that both paradigms give 
completely different perspectives to the judicial system’s domain. It is good to keep this in 








3. The quantitative paradigm: the work terrain of the judicial system 
 
The work terrain of the judicial system will be looked at in the quantitative paradigm. In this 
approach that work terrain will preferably be represented in terms of number of cases. First of 
all we will give a short sketch of the judicial system’s domain (par. 3.1). Such a “basic” 
description does not give much insight, because the judicial system is a result of a 
demarcation with respect to other relevant activities and/or participants. When we show this 
demarcation the judicial system’s domain gets more emphasis. (par. 3.2)  
 
3.1. The judicial system’s domain in figures; the present situation 
 
What does the judicial system’s domain look like? The following sketch can be drawn in 
terms of the quantitative paradigm.†††
 
The Dutch judicial system’s domain is divided unequally into three segments. The division in 
amount of cases is: civil proceedings (59%), criminal proceedings (32%), and administrative 
law proceedings (9%). The workload is divided differently (51%, 22% and 26% respectively), 
because the amount of time spent per case is different. The judicial domain has grown by 2% 
in the period from 2004 to 2005. The growth is primarily to be found in administrative cases 
(5%) and appeal cases (4%).    
 
In civil matters 44% of the cases are dealt with by the Sub-district Court and 15% by the 
District Court. The biggest growth is to be found in insolvency pronouncements (5%) and 
family cases (4%). That last has to do with an increased number of supervision orders in child 
cases (10%). The first has to do with the economic situation, after an economic recovery the 
insolvencies follow quickly after. That has contributed again to a growth in the number of 
civil appeal cases for the courts of appeal (11%). The most remarkable development in the 
civil sector during the past year is the institutionalizing of referrals to mediation by nine law 
courts and one court of appeal. 720 mediations took place in 2005, of which 357 (50%) were 
finalized by the end of the year. While this is a nice result in itself, it is only a fraction of the 
total amount of cases that were eligible for this. Finally, the number of share lease case 
settlements is remarkable. Despite the Duisenberg regulation‡‡‡ – where the order declaring a 
collective agreement in a procedure is pending at the Amsterdam court of appeal – there are 
1400 cases pending. In order to streamline the settlements the sector chairmen have set-up a 
list of points for consideration, a data bank and appointed a coordinator per jurisdiction. 
 
The sub-district sectors took 18% of the criminal cases (32% of the total) (offences, Mulder 
cases) and the law courts 14% (police judge, three judge panel). There was a decrease of 6% 
to report here in the number of cases, which can principally be explained by changes in law 
regarding the length of pre-trial detention (90 days), as a result of which the amount of in 
camera proceedings decreased. Also the expected growth of new cases based on the security 
program did not materialize. The most remarkable development was the re-division of 
criminal cases by the National Coordination Centre Mega Cases, set-up in 2004, where 68 
                                                          
††† The figures relating to the Netherlands are derived from the “Jaarverslag 2005 De Rechtspraak, of the “Raad 
voor de Rechtspraak”. However it must be emphasized that the majority of the civil and administratieve law 
problems are not brought to court. Research into the “dispute settlement delta” has shown that only in 11% of the 
cases official proceedings will be started, court proceedings are only instigated  in 5% of the total amount of 
legal problems. B.C.J. van Velthoven & M.J. ter Voert, with the cooperation of M. van Gammeren-Zoeteweij, 
Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2003: over verloop en afloop van (potentieel) juridische problemen van burgers, Den 
Haag: WODC/Meppel: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2004, p. 184. 
‡‡‡ Cf. infra, p. 20. 
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cases were registered of which 24 were referred to a judge other than the formally authorized 
judge.   
 
Of the administrative cases (9% of the total) 5% were related to alien cases and 4% to general 
administration cases. There was a 9% increase to be noted over the whole sector 
(administration cases, aliens’ cases and tax cases). This was chiefly attributed to the growth in 
cases concerning the WOZ (tax law) by 65% because of the WOZ assessments in 2005. A new 
addition in 2005 was the introduction of appeal adjudication in tax cases; one court per area of 
jurisdiction, and five courts of appeal for appeal cases. No extra workload was attracted by the 
new first line regulations. 
 
When we take a global look we can conclude that the judicial domain has (once again) made a 
small growth (2%) in 2005, and the explanation can be found in incidental factors like 
economic growth (for insolvencies and dissolution of employment contracts), large scale 
administrative regulations (the WOZ assessments 2005), and a change in the law (for pre-trial 
detention). Are there also developments of a less incidental nature at work here? In order to 
investigate this question we must look differently at the judicial domain. 
 
The analysis of Marc Galanter, regarding the development of the judicial domain in a 
quantitative sense in the United States,§§§ can be used as a point of reference for that research. 
Galanter comes to the – surprising – observation that the number of proceedings closed with a 
judicial decision**** and the number of proceedings in general in the United States have 
decreased in the last forty years. No “litigation explosion” at all – as the legend would have us 
believe – but in reality a “trial implosion”. While almost every other form of legal activity has 
increased in size, the amount of proceedings has decreased not only in comparison to the total 
amount of cases pending at the courts but also in comparison to the population and size of the 
economy.††††
 
The federal courts handled almost 10% fewer civil cases in 2002 than in 1962, the absolute 
number of civil proceedings came to 60% less than in the mid-eighties. Not only the number 
but also the contents of the judicial domain for civil cases have changed. In 1962 proceedings 
in the field of contracts – and liability law – accounted for most of the civil proceedings 
(74%), in 2002 this percentage had been reduced to 38%. In contrast to this there was a rise in 
proceedings for the protection of citizens’ rights: from 1% of the total number of civil cases in 
1962, to more than 33% in 2002 (and 41% if you only look at “jury trials”).  Also the number 
of “prisoner petitions” (including habeas corpus) has increased enormously, despite a 
decrease as a result of regulations to limit the amount of cases. Proceedings of this type 
amounted to 12.7% of the total number of proceedings in 2002. The percentages and absolute 
amounts of federal criminal proceedings show the same picture. Even though the total number 
of criminal cases has risen somewhat (from 33,110 in 1962 to 76,827 in 2002), the number of 
proceedings has decreased by 30% in the period from 1962 to 2002 (from 5,097 to 3,574).  As 
far as insolvency cases and insolvency proceedings are concerned a similar development has 
taken place. The justice system for administrative cases in the United States is entrusted to 
                                                          
§§§ M. Galanter, ‘The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, vol. 1, issue 3, 2004, p. 459-570. 
**** Galanter is starting from the concept “trial”, which is defined as “a contested proceeding before a jury or 
court in which evidence is introduced” (op. cit., note 2). In one “trial” several cases can be dealt with (for 
example collective claims for damages in civil liability law). It is also possible that in one case several 
proceedings take place, in which various aspects of the case are taken into consideration. 
†††† Galanter, op. cit., p. 460. 
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“administrative tribunals” and other forums that do not belong to the judicial system. 
However, the trend of a decreasing number of cases is also to be seen there.‡‡‡‡
 
The development does not limit itself to the Federal courts: also at the “State courts”, where 
the majority of proceedings take place, there was – both for civil proceedings and for criminal 
proceedings – a decline in the number of proceedings taking place. The decline in civil cases 
was for both cases which are settled by a “jury trial” (from 1.8% of the total amount of cases 
in 1976 to 0.6% in 2002), as well as cases settled by a professional judge (“bench trial”) (of 
34.3% in 1976 to 15.2% in 2002). The absolute number of jury trials has declined by a third in 
the period researched and the absolute number of “bench trials” by 6.6%. Concerning 
criminal cases the number of proceedings at the State courts between 1976 and 2002 has 
declined from 8.5% to 3.3%. In evaluating these figures one must also be aware of the fact 
that the character of the average proceedings during this period of time has also changed, in 
the sense that they have become more long-term and complex.     
  
What are the root-causes of this “trial implosion”? Galanter observes a shift in ideology and 
practice by the parties involved in the proceedings, the lawyers and the judges.§§§§ As a result 
of media portrayal the parties involved in proceedings have changed their strategies (take for 
example the dangers involved in “jury trials”). The decline in the number of proceedings can 
be explained (in any event for civil cases) by a reduced supply of cases, cases being diverted 
to other forums (ADR), and abandoning of proceedings because of increased complexity, 
costs and length of time involved. A change in ideology and practice can also be observed on 
the institutional side of the judicial system. “Managerial judging” aimed at arranging cases 
and getting rid of the caseload (Galanter speaks of a “turn to judges as promoters of 
settlement and case managers”*****) has grown considerably since the sixties. A consequence 
of this is that both judges and lawyers have less experience in proceedings and possibly 
because of this are less inclined to allow cases presented to them to develop into proceedings. 
Galanter emphasizes the impact that the developments just described can have on the role of 
the judicial system in (American) society. If the number of judgments from proceedings 
decreases then the legal framework for other forms of dispute settlement will decrease in 
number and importance. Adapting is then no longer “bargaining in the shadow of the 
law”†††††, but threatens to become a negotiation process where legal standards get swallowed 
up. 
 
With that last remark we are anticipating the observations on the judicial domain viewed by 
the qualitative paradigm. Before we are ready to research the role of the judicial system in 
society we should first complete the quantitative paradigm research. Are the same tendencies 
and root-causes perceptible in the Netherlands as they are in the United States? What factors 
actually influence the scope and composition of the judicial system’s work terrain here? The 
answers to these questions demand that we broaden our perspective. Some steps, to this end, 
will be taken in the next paragraph. 
 
3.2. The judicial domain on the move: long-term developments  
  
The boundaries of the judicial domain will be examined below as being a result of the 
demarcation between adjacent domains, namely, the judicial domain and the domains of other 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡ Galanter, op. cit., p. 499-500. 
§§§§ Galanter, op. cit., p. 515 ff. 
***** Galanter, op. cit., p. 520. 
††††† Galanter, op. cit., p. 525 and the literature quoted in note 122. 
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participants and activities. Sometimes the boundaries are a result of conscious acts, sometimes 
of autonomous developments. The most important neighboring boundary domains are: 
 
A. other state powers (legislature and government administration); 
B. other legal orders (international and European) 
C. other forms of dispute settlement (particularly ADR) and legal advice 
D. the citizen 
 
Besides the external boundaries there are also the internal domain boundaries that affect the 
relationship amongst courts and amongst judges. These will also be discussed below. It should 
be kept in mind, while reading this, that the term “the judicial domain” can be interpreted in 
several ways, that is to say in legal terms (authority, powers, jurisdiction), in economic terms 
(supply and demand, markets), in sociological terms (social developments), or in a 
combination of all three (like in this paper). In this context some developments will be 
discussed below that meet the following criteria: (a) legal/social developments, which (b) are 
of influence on the size of the judicial domain, and (c) are significant for the composition of 
the legal fields, and (d) concern one or more of the aforementioned external relations (or the 
mutual internal relations between courts and judges). We are going to investigate the different 
relations that constitute the judicial domain in this context. 
 
A. Conflicting powers (the relation to other state powers) 
 
A hundred years of legal developments in the Netherlands has led to a judicial domain 
enlargement as regards the legislature and government administration. This “enlarging 
scope”‡‡‡‡‡ of the judge’s domain is a result of the interaction between the legislature and the 
judge. In the first place the legislature has given away part of its domain to the civil judge 
through the setting-up of “open norms” and Framework Laws. “Open norms” give more 
scope to the judge in applying legislation. The Supreme Court has played a decisive role in 
the use that has been made of this freedom. Assessment standards such as “reasonableness 
and fairness” (article 6:2 and 6:248 BW) and “sufficient interest” (article 3:303 BW) have 
been seized upon to direct legal developments, sometimes probably in another direction than 
the legislature had in mind.§§§§§ Moreover the judge has regularly gone further himself by 
making clear standards vague.****** A helping hand from the legal profession has further 
helped the judge to steer jurisdiction down new roads.†††††† Demands from society also make 
it difficult for the judge to say “no”.‡‡‡‡‡‡ In the second place the enlargement of the 
discretionary competence of the state administration which goes with the framework 
legislation has led to more demand for legal control of the governing administration’s 
actions.§§§§§§ Finally the judicial domain has been extended by the rise in cases concerning the 
respect of provisions of treaty law, in particular testing the regulations of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). With 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡ That term has been introduced by J. van den Berg with regard to the ECHR. See J.Th.J. van den Berg, 
‘Politieke wetenschap en derde macht’, Acta politica 1991, p. 1206 ff. and by the same author ‘De rechter als 
politieke macht’, in: M.G. Rood (ed.), Rechters en politiek. Nationale en internationale beschouwingen, Zwolle: 
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1993, p. 25-40. 
§§§§§ N.J.H. Huls, ‘Grenzen van rechterlijke domeinuitbreiding’, in: N.J.H. Huls & M.A. Loth (ed.), Het domein 
van de rechter, Kluwer: Deventer 2004, p. 81-92, here p. 82. 
****** Huls, op. cit., p. 84. 
†††††† See infra, p. 15. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ See infra, p. 17. 
§§§§§§ Huls, op.cit., p. 82. 
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that development the gap in legal protection as a result of the prohibition on constitutional 
review by article 120 of the Constitution could be counteracted.*******
 
The domain conflicts between the state powers form the institutional translation of domain 
shifts between legal institutions, politics and morality. Elsewhere one of us has described the 
shift as a contextualizing of the law that has made its claim during the 20th century.††††††† 
While the legal order in the 19th century had strict lines between law and politics (law-
making versus law enforcement) and between law and morality (public minimum standards 
versus aspired ideals), those borders blurred during the 20th century. Private law showed a 
blurring of the borders between law and morality, that can be typified as a moralization of the 
law (the increased importance of unwritten standards in the law) and on the other hand as a 
juridification of morality (an extension of the legal domain to a relationship of trust).  In short 
the judicial domain has become larger, but at the same time legal standards have been diluted 
with social standards and moral conceptions (“the flow of ethics into the law”, as Pitlo called 
it‡‡‡‡‡‡‡). Public law, for its part, has shown a dimming of the borders between law and 
politics, that have the same two sides; on the one side a politicization of the law (“from 
codification to modification”, in the famous words of Koopmans§§§§§§§), on the other side a 
juridification of politics (“good governance”, the general principles of proper administration). 
Here also a blurring of the domain has occurred; an increase in the judicial domain is 
accompanied by a dilution of the law. It is these broad social developments which underpin 
the border conflicts between the different state powers, as we have described above. 
 
Where does the tendency towards domain enlargement end? Have the limits been reached 
already? In the evaluation of the relations between the judicial system and the administration 
an objection has been made against the “juridification of the public administration”. The 
interest of the administration to increase power to solve conflicts has been pointed out. The 
administration should not be limited to the implementation of a legitimacy test for basic 
decisions, but should get the scope to solve conflicts between citizens and the administration 
through consultation and conciliation.******** From the political side of the fence the policy of 
the Balkenende III cabinet has been aimed at pushing the judge back to “the second 
line”.†††††††† This point of view rests on a double justification. On the one hand the citizen’s 
own responsibility is foremost according to the government. On the other hand the policy 
aims to contribute to the capacity problems of the judicial system. In order to “improve 
legislation”, “criminal law (…) can pull back to the benefit of administrative law or liability 
                                                          
******* The prohibition of article 120 of the Constitution has recently been extensively brought up for discussion 
in the private member’s bill of  Femke Halsema of 11 April 2002, in which a plea was made for a partial 
abolition of the prohibition of article 120 of the Dutch Constitution. See Kamerstukken II, 2001-2002, 28 331, 
nr. 2 and 3. 
††††††† M.A. Loth & A.M.P. Gaakeer, Meesterlijk recht, third edition, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 
2005, p. 39-42. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ A. Pitlo, Evolutie in het privaatrecht, second edition, Groningen: Tjeenk Willink 1972, p. 58. Cf. supra 
concerning the consequences of the increased number of  “open norms” in legislation. 
§§§§§§§ T. Koopmans, De rol van de wetgever, in: H.C.F. Schoordijk et al. (ed.), Honderd jaar rechtsleven, 
Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1970, p. 221-235, here p. 223. 
******** Werkgroep-Van Kemenade, Bestuur in geding. Rapport van de Werkgroep inzake terugdringing van de 
juridisering van het openbaar bestuur, Haarlem: Provincie Noord-Holland 1997, p. 49-51. Cf. Kamerstukken II, 
1994-1995, 24 236, nr. 3 (MvT Wet rechtstreeks beroep), p. 3, and Kamerstukken II, 1999-2000, 27 024, nr. 3 
(MvT Kosten bestuurlijke voorprocedures), p. 5. 
†††††††† Kamerstukken II, 2003-2004, 29 279, nr. 9 (Rechtsstaat en Rechtsorde, Nota Bruikbare rechtsorde). Cf. 
M.A. Loth, ‘Met openbaar gezag bekleed; over het publieke karakter van rechtspraak’, in: Huls & Loth 2004, p. 
43-59, here p. 45. 
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law, self-regulating systems can use alternative dispute settlement”.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Measures taken in 
this respect are: (i) the “Mulderizing” of bulk cases and generally the shift of criminal law to 
administrative law; (ii) the settling of criminal cases by the Public Prosecution Service§§§§§§§§; 
and (iii) the setting-up of “court annexed mediation”.*********
 
This withdrawal of the judge from the public domain brings dangers with it. The setting-up of 
a “punishing administration” and the settling of criminal cases by the Public Prosecution 
Service can lead to a loss of legal protection for the citizen. This objection was already 
invoked in the debate concerning the theory of abolitionism, which pleads for the abolition of 
the criminal law enforcement system.††††††††† The citizen loses the guarantees for a fair trial 
(article 6 paragraph 1 ECHR) that apply to judges for settling cases. The possibilities for 
domain restriction reach their limits when the public character of the judicial system comes 
into play. The settlement of cases by the judge contributes to the accessibility of the judicial 
system, the legal protection of the citizen and the authority of the judge. For complex cases 
the development of the legal order is best served when performed in public.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ We have 
already seen above that Galanter also pointed to this risk (see par. 3.1). 
 
The judicial domain acts like a shuttle that moves from domain enlargement to domain 
reduction in relation to the legislature and the governing administration. Which way should 
the movement go? Insofar as the answer to this question is dependent on policy and choice – 
and not autonomous developments – it depends on the role of the judicial system in the legal 
order: what criteria and public interests determine the limits? The qualitative paradigm raises 
its head again, more to follow below. 
 
B. Internationalization (the relation to other legal orders) 
 
The development of the international and European legal orders forms a second factor 
influencing the Dutch judicial domain. This development characterizes itself through the 
increased stream of legislation with an international and supranational legal source. Plurality 
or a pluralism of legal sources has arisen as a result of the increased influence of international 
and supranational law on the national legal order.§§§§§§§§§ The national judge has got 
“competition” from new courts on an international and supranational level. In the Dutch legal 
system, the jurisdictions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) have acquired a particularly large influence. However, the possibility 
of judicial review of the respect of treaty provisions offers the Dutch judiciary the possibility 
of testing provisions made by laws in a formal sense against higher rules. The legal protection 
of the citizen can, in this way, be better guaranteed.**********  
 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Kamerstukken II, 2003-2004, 29 279, nr. 9 (Rechtsstaat en Rechtsorde, Nota Bruikbare rechtsorde), p. 12. 
§§§§§§§§ Kamerstukken II, 2005-2006, 29849 (Wet OM-afdoening); ‘OM mag zelf straffen opleggen’, NRC 
Handelsblad, 5 July 2006, p. 2. 
********* Cf. infra, p. 14. 
††††††††† About that theory, see, among others, L.H.C. Hulsman, Afscheid van het strafrecht: een pleidooi voor 
zelfregulering, Houten: Het Wereldvenster 1986; J.R. Blad, Abolitionisme als strafrechtstheorie: theoretische 
beschouwingen over het abolitionisme van L.H.C. Hulsman, doctoral thesis EUR, Deventer: Gouda Quint 1996. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Loth 2004, p. 50-51. 
§§§§§§§§§ Thus Koopmans. See G.J. Wiarda, Drie typen van rechtsvinding, fourth edition, revised by and provided 
with an epilogue by T. Koopmans, Deventer: Tjeenk Willink 1999. 
********** T. Koopmans, Courts and political institutions. A comparative view, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2003, p. 182; Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, De toekomst van de nationale 
rechtsstaat, Rapporten aan de regering, nr. 63, 2002, p. 28. 
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New domain questions have arisen with the internationalization of our legal order. There is an 
overlapping of jurisdictions between the national and European courts, both from a territorial 
perspective as well as a functional perspective. As far as EU law is concerned the national 
judge has the authority to apply that law in cases that occur in the territory of the Member 
State. In case of doubt about the explanation of European rules the European Court of Justice 
can be asked a prejudicial question, this is even obligatory for the highest national 
judges.†††††††††† The ECJ is charged in this way with guaranteeing uniform application of EU 
law in all Member States. The ECJ has thus a functional authority to explain the rules under 
EU jurisdiction, while its territorial authority covers the whole territory of (the Member States 
of) the Union. The national judge gets an extra functional authority – concerning the 
application of European legislation – whereas his territorial authority stays the same and at the 
same time coincides with (a part of) the jurisdiction of the ECJ.  
 
The advancing internationalization is of influence in another way on the sources that the 
national judge uses.  In an internationalizing world there is room for a “transnational dialogue 
of judges”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡, in the sense that the highest national courts often consult the case law of 
the highest courts in other countries to see how a solution was found to a certain case. In a 
comprehensive overview, Guy Canivet (President of the French Cour de cassation) has 
indicated when this can occur: “The resort to comparative law is found, for example, each 
time that the national law has the need to be completed or modernized; when the judge rules 
on great societal issues; when a question is common to several countries; when the solution 
has an economic dimension that exceeds the limits of the legal system in which it applies; 
and, finally, when it is a question of deciding purely technical matters”.§§§§§§§§§§ This 
development, as well as academic projects focused on the harmonization of legal areas, lies at 
the base of the development of “transnational law” and the harmonization or unification of 
law between the different countries.*********** The internationalization of the national legal 
order has a double impact on the national judge’s domain: on the one hand he has an extended 
stock of legal sources that he can use, on the other hand the internationalization leads to a 
restriction of the autonomy for law-making by the national legislature and by the judge. Is 
there a marginalizing of the national judge (for example the Supreme Court, which only 
considers legal questions, against the European Court of Human Rights that also takes the 
facts into consideration), or does the national judicial system form the point of reference for 
both the national and international legal order, as a result of which its domain is only enlarged 
(like the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) put it)?†††††††††††
 
In the Netherlands the debate on internationalization is a step further than in the surrounding 
countries, where constitutional law allows a less far-reaching impact of international law on 
                                                          
†††††††††† Article 234 EC-Treaty. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Witness the remarks of G. Canivet et al. During the HiiL congress, ‘Second Hague Colloquium on 
Fundamental Principles of Law. Supreme Courts in an internationalised world: challenges for the trias politica 
and the coherency of law?’, The Hague, June 30th and July 1st 2006. The report of the congress is available at  
http://www.hiil.org. 
§§§§§§§§§§ G. Canivet, The practice of comparative law by the supreme courts: brief reflections on the dialogue 
between the judges in French and European experience, Tulane Law Review, volume 80, nr. 4, 2006, p. 1377-
1400, here p. 1391. 
*********** Concerning European civil law, see among others M.W. Hesselink, The New European Private Law. 
Essays on the Future of Private Law in Europe, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2002 
(the publication contains among other things the inaugural lecture of the author about “the New European Legal 
Culture”); A.S. Hartkamp, M. Veldman and others (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, third edition, 
Nijmegen/The Hague: Ars Aequi Libri/Kluwer Law International 2004. 
††††††††††† WRR, De toekomst van de nationale rechtsstaat, The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers 2002, p. 32 and p. 81 
(“…blijft de nationale staat vooralsnog het belangrijkste ankerpunt van de rechtsorde, ook de internationale…”). 
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its national system than is the case in the Netherlands.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Also a factor that plays a part 
in the Dutch system is the possibility of judicial review of the respect of treaty provisions, 
which – in the absence of a mechanism for constitutional review of laws – has gained a 
prominent place in the national judge’s administration of justice.§§§§§§§§§§§
 
The final conclusion is that the internationalization of our legal order can lead to both a 
judicial domain loss as well as to a judicial domain gain. There is a domain loss in the sense 
that the national judge gives away part of his jurisdiction – final judgments amongst other 
things – to the international and European judges. At the same time there is a domain gain, the 
national judge has more legal sources to call upon and gets an additional (functional) 
jurisdiction in the application of European law. For this last point a remark needs to be made 
that the increase in the amount of sources has consequences for the judge’s autonomy. In 
2015 will there be talk of domain gain or domain loss for the national judge as a result of the 
internationalizing tendency? The answer is dependent on the question whether our legal order 
becomes more internationalized************ as well as the question what role the national judge 
will play in the European legal order. Here – on another level – the qualitative paradigm 
surfaces again. 
 
C. Juridification (the relation to other forms of dispute settlement) 
 
The question of juridification raises its head again when we cast a glance at the relations 
within the national legal order. Can a domain enlargement or domain restriction be observed 
in the relation of the law with other forms of dispute settlement? The boundary of the judicial 
domain in relation to alternative ways of settling disputes (like arbitration, mediation, 
rehabilitation, neighborhood justice projects (JIB)) is especially relevant. The choice citizens 
make for a certain solution strategy to their legal problems can be considered as an assessment 
of costs and benefits. On the one hand the possible choices are stipulated by the problem, on 
the other hand by the offer of help that is available.†††††††††††† Does the greater offer of “aid” – 
in the form of more methods for settling disputes – lead to a less busy judicial system, or does 
it only create extra demand? In the Outline Policy Document on the modernization of the 
judicial organization the concept of “tailor-made justice” was introduced, which offers 
opportunities for the judicial system: 
 
“Accessibility, approachability, cost-efficiency and reduction of the long waiting time, 
in short a judicial system that is tailor-made, self-regulating and with a strong focus on 
its social surroundings.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡
 
What applies to this tendency is to “strive for the correct type of dispute settler (judge, 
mediator, etc) to solve the correct type of disputes”.§§§§§§§§§§§§ This development can have 
several consequences as we have already seen in Galanter’s analysis. In the first place it leads 
                                                          
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ This applies in particular to the dualistic systems of the United Kingdom and Germany. C.A.J.M. 
Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht, fifth edition, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p. 183. 
§§§§§§§§§§§ See among others L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Rode draad “Constitutionele toetsing”: Constitutionele toetsing in 
internationaal perspectief’, Ars Aequi 2003, p. 89-95. 
************ See the scenarios in Justitie over Morgen. 
†††††††††††† Report Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2003, p. 184. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Contourennota modernisering rechterlijke organisatie, Rechtspraak in de 21e eeuw, Kamerstukken II, 
1998-1999, nr. 26 352, p. 17. Central points to chapter 6 dedicated to “tailor-made justice” are the procedural 
and financial accessibility to the administration of justice and the ease of contact with it.  
§§§§§§§§§§§§ Commissie Evaluatie Modernisering Rechterlijke Organisatie, Referentiemodel De modernisering van 
de rechtspraak, p. 4. Available at http://www.evaluatiero.nl/publicaties/referentiemodel/. 
 15
to a change in the role of the judge who acts less as a “litigator” and more as a “mediator” and 
“case manager.” In the second place there are risks involved in offering “tailor-made justice”. 
One risk in connection to this is the possible “loss of rights”************* for the citizen. In 
California, for example, the “private justice” practice has taken off; a lot of claims in the 
construction sector are settled by means of arbitration. A “two tier system of justice” has 
arisen: “public justice” that takes place in the courts in public, and “private justice” that takes 
place via alternative dispute settling methods in private. The withdrawal of the judge, which is 
a consequence of this, can lead to a “loss of rights” and a bleaker society.††††††††††††† Again 
the question arises: which criteria and public interests determine the boundaries? Again the 
domain delineation in a quantitative sense is dependent on the answer to the question of the 
judicial system’s role in the legal order and in society (the qualitative paradigm).  
 
Legal advice also plays a role in the demarcation of the work terrain of the judicial system. In 
this respect it is important that the number of lawyers constantly increases, as a result of 
which an extension of the legal profession’s work terrain will be sought after more 
inventively – for example by introducing the “no cure, no pay” system – and with that the 
work terrain of the judge.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ We have already pointed out that the legal profession 
can bring new ideas to the judge concerning decision making in concrete cases.§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
Further developments in the Bar have recently been mapped-out by the Van Wijmen 
Commission and in the position paper of the legal sociologist Nick Huls.************** There is 
a development to be seen of more specialization and commercialization in the upper segment 
of the market. The lower segment of the market characterizes itself by the creation of “legal 
aid counters”. In connection with access to the law there is no new gap visible with regard to 
the guarantee of “access to justice”. However, attention should be given to the negative image 
that many citizens have of the legal profession and the consequences this has for access to the 
law.†††††††††††††† The current discussion in the Netherlands focuses on, among other things, the 
question of “no cure, no pay”.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In short: the development of the Bar forms an 
engine sooner than a brake for judicial domain enlargement. 
 
D. Legal cooperation (the internal relations between courts)  
 
Questions of domain control and domain split play a role within the judicial organization in 
the Netherlands. Principles of efficiency are expressed in, amongst other things, the demand 
in article 6 paragraph 1 ECHR for judgments of cases to be carried out within a reasonable 
period of time. According to these principles a new assessment should be made concerning 
the use of capacity and expertise. The discussion concerning judicial concentration, where by 
means of directives from the Council for the Judiciary a tendency towards rationalization is 
taking place, should be seen in this light. Cases are no longer settled on the basis of territorial 
                                                          
************* The term comes from Vranken; see J.B.M. Vranken, ‘ADR en de gevolgen voor rechterlijke 
rechtsvorming: een verwaarloosde samenhang’, in: E.J. Broers & B. van Klink (eds.), De rechter als 
rechtsvormer, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2001, p. 241-255. 
††††††††††††† Loth 2004, p. 48. Concerning the jurisdiction in Californië, see also S. Verberk, Rechter onder de 
mensen? Over de externe oriëntatie van de rechterlijke macht in Californië, Research Memoranda nr. 3, The 
Hague: Raad voor de rechtspraak 2005. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Cf. Huls, op.cit., p. 83 and p. 87. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See supra, p. 10. 
************** Van Wijmen Commission, Een maatschappelijke Orde, report of April 24th 2006. N.J.H. Huls & 
Z.D. Laclé, Meer macht voor de consument? Een position paper ten behoeve van de Commissie Van Wijmen, 
The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006.  
†††††††††††††† Cf. in this respect the report Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2003, p. 189-192. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Report Van Wijmen Commission, p. 44-48. See also ‘Donner tegen “no cure, no pay” in 
advocatuur’, press report of June 24th 2004. 
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aspects, by the court that is easiest to reach for the person subject to trial, but rather by the 
court that from a functional point of view is the best equipped to reach a correct and quick 
judgment. There is a development from territorial to functional jurisdiction. Thus another 
organization arises in the domain demarcation between the various courts: no longer courts 
with similar task packages spread out over the State’s territory but courts with their own 
specialized area and size.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ This idea was recently confirmed in the report published 
by the Van der Winkel Commission. That Commission had the task “to make an inventory of 
what actual forms of cooperation (organization models) are available and to what extent these 
different models form an answer to the problems identified within the legal system 
(diagnoses) in the light of the dominant developments within and outside the judicial system 
(trends)”.*************** In the final report there was a case put forward for durable cooperation 
between courts on a regional setting.†††††††††††††††
 
Besides the discussion at institutional level it occurs more frequently that substantive 
agreements are made between courts on the ways of settling cases. It concerns both the 
application of substantive law and the rules of procedural law. Agreements in this respect fall 
under the denominator “legal cooperation”. The reason for these constructions can be found in 
the following developments: (i) capacity problems (the demand on the judicial system grows 
even more than the production increase in company processes as a result of rationalization); 
(ii) the clamor for more legal uniformity (particularly in bulk cases, where agreements are 
made on the use of discretionary powers such as fixing of sentences and 
alimonies).‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Forms of legal cooperation are: (i) agreements between courts; (ii) 
directives (originating from, for example, the Council for the Judiciary and the Circle of Sub-
district Courts); (iii) the application of “soft law” (codes of conduct etc. which are not legally 
binding). In this respect care must be taken that the interpretation of the law is not denatured 
to an “administrative function”. Another problem is formed by the position of the Supreme 
Court and its influence on the lower courts. The judicial system was criticized, for example, in 
the case of the execution of the Debt Redevelopment Act for legal persons (WSNP), because 
the judges in the first instance leaned too much on the motivation demands made by the 
Supreme Court concerning the dismissal of the applications. Because of this the courts were 
threatened to be swamped with WSNP-cases.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§
 
Another judge related variable in the domain scope is the expertise of the judge (versus 
arbitration: if the required expertise cannot be found within the judicial organization then the 
parties will choose for dispute settlement by an arbitration court) and legal activism. At the 
end of the day the question here is also: what role does the judge play in society/the legal 
order? 
 
E. Democratization of the judiciary (relation judicial system and the citizen) 
 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See among others Trema, special issue ‘Wettelijke concentratie van rechtsmacht’, vol. 27, nr. 10, 
December 2004; R. Albers et al., ‘De territoriale verdeling van rechtsmacht in Nederland: bevindingen naar 
aanleiding van de CEPEJ expertmeeting van de Raad van Europa op 6 oktober 2003 te Den Haag’, Trema 2004, 
p. 16-23. 
*************** Goede rechtspraak door sterke regio’s, final report of the Van der Winkel Commission, 14 
september 2006, p. 32. 
††††††††††††††† Goede rechtspraak door sterke regio’s, p. 5-7. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ About the compatibility of such constructions with consitutional law and treaty law, see H.U. 
Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Rechters die afstemmen en afhouden. Vragen over de verenigbaarheid van 
coördinatiestrategieën met art. 17 Grondwet en art. 6 EVRM’, NJB 1999, p. 377-384. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Huls, op.cit., p. 90. 
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The relation between the judicial system and the citizen is in several ways of influence on the 
size of the judicial domain. Two aspects are important in this respect. In the first place the 
legitimacy of the judicial system for the citizen plays a role. On an institutional level the 
judicial system must give such an “input” (for example the guarantee of judicial 
independence) and “output” (for example motivation of judicial decisions), that the citizen 
continues to have confidence in the judicial system.**************** In the second place there is 
a changed attitude towards the judicial system by the citizens themselves following 
developments in society. On the one hand this leads to a changed “input” in the judicial 
organization: individualization in society leads to the creation of a “claim culture” (civil 
law)††††††††††††††††, a growing need for legal protection (administrative law)‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡, and 
a greater demand for security (criminal law).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ On the other hand the attitude of 
the citizen is also important for the “output” of the judicial organization: for the preservation 
of the citizen’s confidence in the functioning of the judiciary, it is not only required that the 
judicial system is for the citizen, but also of the citizen. In connection with this the problem of 
representation of (different groups) of citizens in the judicial system plays a 
role***************** as does the clamor for a lay judicial system.††††††††††††††††† The citizen does 
not only demand the possibility to participate in the judicial system, but sees himself more 
and more as a client of the “judicial system” service. The metaphor “from citizen to client” 
has a positive side to it (customer service, improvement of the judicial system service), but 
also a negative one (citizenship without duties‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡). Citizenship brings certain 
responsibilities with it for the citizen: an active attitude is demanded for maintenance of the 
legal order, and respect for institutions that ensure the proper functioning of the legal order.    
 
                                                          
**************** Cf. M. de S.-O.-L’E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations. A Comparative Analysis of Judicial 
Transparency and Legitimacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004. Research has shown that trust in the 
judiciary in the Netherlands is quite high, in contrast to for instance trust in the legal profession. Report 
Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2003, p. 188-189. 
†††††††††††††††† About this development: Loth & Gaakeer, op.cit., p. 335-343. Research of the WODC shows 
however that the amount of claims at the courts between 1997 and 2000 has not increased, whereas an increase 
of the claimed sums can be observed. See R.J.J. Eshuis, Claims bij de rechtbank, The Hague: Boom Juridische 
uitgevers 2003. Critical with respect to the blowing over of the American claim culture to the Dutch legal 
system: T. Hartlief, Leven in een claimcultuur: wie is er bang voor Amerikaanse toestanden?, inaugural lecture 
Maastricht, 2005; M. Faure & T. Hartlief, ‘Het kabinet en de claimcultuur. Over de (onbezonnen) Hollandse 
vrees voor Amerikaanse toestanden of het Hollands medicijn voor Amerikaanse ziektes’, NJB 1999, p. 2007-
2015. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ H.D. van Wijk, W. Konijnenbelt & R.M. van Male, Hoofdstukken van bestuursrecht, 13th edition, 
Den Haag: Elsevier Juridisch 2005, p. 48. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Cf. among others the “stream of new legislation” within the scope of combat of terrorism; H. de 
Doelder, Terrorisme en de rol van de rechter, winter lecture EUR, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2006, 
p. 6. 
***************** B.P. Sloot, ‘Moeten rechters lijken op de Nederlandse bevolking? Over de wenselijkheid van 
descriptieve representatie door de rechterlijke macht’, Trema 2004, p. 49-62. 
††††††††††††††††† Cf. the discussion started by the member of the Dutch Lower House Joost Eerdmans about this 
subject, and the public hearing which has been held as a result of this on June 19th 2006 in the Dutch Lower 
House. About this  ‘Burgers in toga kosten tijd en geld, nut onzeker’, NRC Handelsblad, June 20th 2006, p. 1. 
The point of view of the NVvR of June 23rd 2006 is available at http://www.nvvr.org/nl-
NL/Content.aspx?type=opinion&id=538. See further among others the letter of the Minister of Justice of 
February 23rd 2006, in case of the adminstration of justice by laymen; Kamerstukken II, 2005-2006, 30 300 VI 
and 29 279, nr. 120 (Rechtsstaat en Rechtsorde). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ H.D. Tjeenk Willink in his Machiavelli lecture from 1995, ‘Overheidscommunicatie, element of 
instrument?’, http://www.stichtingmachiavelli.nl/default.asp?id=00066&curid=00056&site=&type=prijspagina. 
See also the report of the Werkgroep Burgerschap en politieke partijen, part of the National convention, Burgers 
en politiek[e partijen] in de 21e eeuw, available at  
http://www.nationaleconventie.nl/contents/pages/65925/politiekepartijenenburgerschap1404.pdf. 
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In what way are the developments of the relations between the judicial system and the citizen 
of influence on the size of the judicial domain? On the one hand a domain restriction can 
result from this relationship: decreasing confidence of the citizen in the judicial system – as a 
result of legitimacy problems or as a result of the changed attitude of the citizen – can lead to 
a smaller demand for the judicial system and pressure on the traditional working methods 
within the judicial organization.  On the other hand the developments in society could be a 
reason for domain enlargement. The bigger demand on the judicial system “all across the 
board” – as a result of the individualizing of society – can lead to an enlargement of the 
judge’s work area. The most important question here also proves to be: what role does the 
judge play in the legal order and in society? 
 
F. Consequences for the domain: summary  
 
What conclusions can be drawn from the above? The developments at the various levels show 
opposing tendencies, which can lead to an enlargement or to a restriction of the judicial 
domain. 
 
Domain restriction can be a result of: 
 
- pushing the judicial system back to the second line by the administration; 
- losing domain to international and supranational courts; 
- moralization of private law and politicization of administrative law; 
- standardizing of legal judgments through a stricter domain management; 
- de-juridification of dispute settlement through availability of alternatives; 
- decrease in confidence of the citizen leading to less demand and more pressure on the 
traditional working methods; 
 
Domain enlargement can result from: 
 
- increased scope with regard to other state powers; 
- juridification of politics (control in public law) and morality (from confidence 
relations to legal relationships in private law); 
- increase in flow of legislation from international and supranational origin; 
- jurisdiction of the judge in international and European law; 
- internationalization leading to a strengthening of the judiciary with respect to the 
political powers; 
- more effective domain management leading to greater capacity; 
- in spite of decreasing confidence still a growing demand for the judicial system. 
 
What effects these tendencies have on the judicial domain as sketched in par. 3.1 cannot be 
said. In the first place it has to do with long-term effects, these can be negated by more 
incidental developments on the short-term (like economic development, amendments to laws 
etc.). Moreover the long-term developments described are so complex that the effects cannot 
be individualized (do they lead to a domain enlargement or decline?). Finally we saw that 
these developments are, in a number of ways, dependent on the judge’s role in society and in 






4. The qualitative paradigm: the domain as the role of the judicial system 
 
While describing the judicial domain the underlying question of the judicial system’s social 
role was relevant every time. To get more insight into the judicial domain in terms of the role 
played by the judge we should highlight the connection between the influence of the judge 
and the impact of his judgments. We will first make some remarks below on each of these 
variables separately, and afterwards discuss the connection between them. Much has already 
been written about the influence of the judge and his attitude, especially in terms of judicial 
activism or judicial restraint. Judicial restraint is called legal minimalism by Cass Sunstein, 
and by this he means the attitude of making as few judgments as possible, or otherwise 
formulated, leaving as much open as possible. The obvious advantage to minimalism is that 
the burden of forming a judgment is limited and the risk and impact of mistakes are kept to a 
minimum. Such a “constructive use of silence” is noted when questions of principle and of 
great complexity are in a lawsuit, upon which people have strong and divided opinions. 
Minimalist judges look, in such situations, to finding their way through “incompletely 
theorized agreement”, sometimes in abstract form, sometimes in the form of judgments linked 
to facts. They would rather not work deductively but prefer to look for a connection in the 
specific facts of a case.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Minimalists, one could say, are contextualists. 
 
Sunstein distinguishes between wide and deep judicial judgments in order to get a better 
picture of judicial judgments. The width has to do with the consequences of a judgment for 
other cases; wide judgments have value of precedent, narrow judgments only very little. The 
depth of a judgment has to do with the degree to which the motivation is specified; deep 
judgments are exhaustively reasoned, shallow judgments not. Sunstein combines both 
categories with each other resulting in four categories: (i) wide and deep, (ii) wide and 
superficial, (iii) narrow and deep, and (iv) narrow and superficial. Of course both the width 
and depth of a judgment are relative; the one judgment is relatively deep with respect to 
another judgment. When we translate the defined categories into the Dutch situation we can 
demonstrate them with some examples:******************
  
(i) Wide and deep: examples are the judgments IZA-Vrerink and Van Wijngaarden-State. 
They offer general rules with a large value of precedent and are moreover exhaustively 
reasoned. The judgment IZA-Vrerink (HR 28 February 1992, NJ 1993, 566) had to do with 
the refinement by the Supreme Court of the statutory regulation concerning traffic liability. 
The minimum liability for the owner of an automobile who is involved in an accident with a 
non-motorized adult partaking in the traffic was fixed at 50%. In Van Wijngaarden-State (HR 
24 April 1992, NJ 1993, 643) the Supreme Court fixed the moment on which it should have 
been clear for entrepreneurs that serious ground pollution caused by companies would entail a 
capital loss for the State. The choice for fixing that date (eventually decided for 1st January 
1975) was reasoned by the demand for clarity with regard to the citizen.  
(ii) Wide and superficial: a good example is the classic judgment Lindenbaum-Cohen. This 
judgment offers a general ruling with a large value of precedent, but is strikingly poorly 
reasoned. In the judgment of 31st January 1919, NJ 1919, p. 161, the explanation of the term 
“tort” was discussed. The Supreme Court gave a wide explanation of this term for the first 
time. “Tort” was not only to be understood as “all actions or omissions to act which are in 
opposition to the law” but also “all actions or omissions to act that go against the good morals 
                                                          
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ C.R. Sunstein, One case at a time, judicial minimalism on the supreme court, Cambridge 
(Mass.)/London: Harvard University Press 1999, chapter 1. 
****************** See also Loth & Gaakeer, op.cit., chapters 1 and 2. 
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or against the care that social traffic aims to provide towards other people or things”. The 
range of the judgment is big, but a detailed argument underlying the judgment is missing; 
(iii) Narrow and deep: examples are the judgments Wrongful birth and Wrongful life. The 
range of these judgments is limited to very specific situations, but they are extensively 
reasoned. “Wrongful birth” had to do with the claim for damages by a parent of an unwanted 
and unplanned baby against the doctor who caused the pregnancy by prescribing wrong 
medicine. In the judgment of 21st February 1997, NJ 1999, 145 (Wrongful birth) the Supreme 
Court ruled that the costs for the care and education of the child were seen as damages which 
qualified for compensation. The judgment was extensively reasoned, the underlying 
motivation behind this being to legitimize the judgment to society. In the judgment Wrongful 
life of Kelly (HR 18 March 2005, LJN: AR5213, C03/206HR), the Supreme Court ruled that 
the obstetrician who had failed in the circumstances of the case to carry out the required 
antenatal diagnostics was liable to the parents of the heavily handicapped child and the child 
itself. Besides legal arguments, arguments of principle and pragmatic arguments were brought 
forward to motivate the judgment††††††††††††††††††; 
(iv) Narrow and superficial: an example is the judgment Ontvanger-Hamm. This was a 
unique case without any precedent effect and the motivation was not deep. In the judgment 
(HR 5 September 1997, NJ 1998, 437) the Supreme Court ruled that in the event of undue 
payment in a bankruptcy case, the trustee had an obligation to cooperate in undoing the 
mistake. The reasoning behind this was not repeated in later cases, what brought Vranken to 
make the following comment: “Ontvanger/Hamm does not reach further than itself (…). 
When, despite many, many attempts it is not possible to determine a rationale of a judgment 
that reaches further than a concrete (type) of case, then the conclusion can be none other than 
that the rationale does not exist. Ontvanger/Hamm is Einzelfallgerechtigkeit, a judgment that 
is completely one of a kind.”‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡
 
Those were a few preliminary features on the influence of the judge and the impact of his 
judgments. When we compare both variables – activism/minimalism and wide/deep – with 
each other we can demonstrate some consequences for the judicial domain.  
 
Domain enlargement in the width. When we have an activist judge who (often) makes wide 
judgments, we can talk of domain enlargement in the width. There are enough examples to be 
found in primary jurisdiction. The Commissioner-judges in WSNP-cases have shown 
themselves to be activist, and by mutual cooperation have given their judgments a large 
precedent working. Sometimes it is the legislature who has facilitated the domain 
enlargement, like in the regulation of “class actions” and in the declaration of binding force of 
regulations (Dexia).§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Sometimes it is the judge himself who has paved the way 
to domain enlargement through directives and other forms of legal cooperation. A concrete 
lawsuit is used by the judge as an excuse to solve a social problem. The image of the judge 
                                                          
†††††††††††††††††† See M.A. Loth, ‘"Engaged in a Search for Justice": over grenzeloze aansprakelijkheid en de 
moeizame integratie van een moreel principe’, in: M. Buijsen (ed.), Onrechtmatig leven? Opstellen naar 
aanleiding van Baby Kelly, Nijmegen: Valkhof Pers 2006. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Annotation Vranken at HR 7 June 2002, NJ 2002, 608. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The case of hundreds and thousands of duped investors was settled by Dexia in 2005 with two 
nonprofit organizations, the Consumentenbond and the Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, for the sum of about 1 
billion Euro. The negotiations were conducted by the former president of the Dutch and European Central Bank 
Wim Duisenberg. The case was the first to be dealt with under the new Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade 
of June 23rd 2005, coming into force on July 27th 2005. This law gives the judge the possilibity to declare a 
settlement about the compensation between the person responsible and the victim organizations applicable to all 
victims. See kamerstukken 29 414; Stbl. 2005, 340 and 380; E. Jorritsma, ‘Rechters zijn niet blij met deze wet’, 
NRC Handelsblad, May 19th 2006, p. 13. 
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that is appropriate here is that of an activist judge with an eye for the social context of his 
work (“social engineer”), one who addresses himself more than normal to the effective and 
efficient management of his “caseload” (“caseload manager”). In short, the judge is an 
organizer who enlarges his domain at the cost of the legislature and other judges (for future, 
similar cases). If this development were completed, it would mean a greater responsiveness by 
the judge, with all the opportunities and risks that go with it (see par.1). For the judicial power 
as a whole this development means growth in the direction of a different job description 
(“different and more”). 
 
Domain restriction in the width. Minimalism as described by Sunstein leads to a domain 
restriction in the width. Minimalist judges avoid precedent forming both on principle grounds 
(task of the legislature), and for pragmatic reasons (consequences are not calculable). The 
motto is literally “one case at a time”, as Sunstein’s book title puts it. The traditional, old-
fashioned judicial system fits this picture; the cantonal judge, the police judge, the 
administrative judge etc. For the judiciary as a whole these developments mean an unaltered 
growth, possibly in the direction of the “second line”. The idea of a useful legal order with a 
repositioning of the judicial system as a “last resort” fits perfectly in this development. The 
judiciary as a whole will hardly grow, at the most the tasks will be shifted from the forming of 
decisions to the control of them (“small is beautiful”). 
 
The question of choosing for domain enlargement or decrease in the width is a repeating 
dilemma for the Dutch Supreme Court: to either make a judgment on nothing more than is 
needed for a case, or serve the legal system by making law, and forming and monitoring legal 
uniformity with broader judgments?******************* In legal economic terms the solution is 
easy to formulate: it should be the lowest possible judgment costs and mistake costs. Good 
judges strive to reduce the judicial workload and the number of errors and the impact of 
errors. How this is achieved, is very much dependent on the circumstances. A broad judgment 
is appropriate when it concerns a frequently recurring case, or when the judge is fairly sure of 
his judgment, or when it is important that the parties to a case can plan their behaviour. But 
when circumstances change quickly or society is divided, then a narrow judgment is 
appropriate. Sometimes a broad judgment is simply difficult to bring about because within the 
court itself there is disagreement on the desirability of the chosen solution or its application in 
the law. 
 
Domain enlargement in depth. When there is an activist judge that makes (many) deep 
judgments, then we talk of domain enlargement in “depth”. Especially in appeal and appeal 
review, judges give a lot of thought to the meaning of their judgments for law making and 
they are sooner inclined to motivate their judgments deeper. The case law of the Supreme 
Court in “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth” is a good example. These judgments not only 
contribute to law making but also to the public debate on controversial cases, and with that to 
the democratic level of society. The lawsuit is especially used as a source for law making by 
the judge, the cosmos in a grain of sand, so to speak. The legal image that fits here is one of 
an activist judge with much attention for the judicial meaning of his judgments. This judicial 
activism can be distinguished from the social activism of the “social engineer”. For the 
judiciary as a whole this development particularly implies a stronger commitment to the rule 
of law, the legal protection of the citizen and revitalizing the law. The result is a growth in the 
judicial organization within the traditional framework (“more, more, more”). 
                                                          
******************* See about this J.M. Barendrecht, De Hoge Raad op de hei: kwaliteitsbewaking en leiding over de 
rechtspraak door de civiele cassatie: een analyse en denkrichtingen voor de toekomst, Deventer: W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink 1998, p. 92-98, and Sunstein 1999, p. 46-60. 
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Domain restriction in depth. When we have a minimalist judge that makes (many) superficial 
judgments, then we can talk of domain restriction in “depth”. In the recent past the solution to 
the capacity problem of the judiciary was sought after in this direction. In criminal law the 
unreasoned acquittals and the head-and-tail judgments are a result of this development. The 
judge becomes a production worker in accordance with his legal assignment, without having 
to worry too much about the strength or conviction of his judgments. Although this 
development clashes with the judicial tradition, it has still been seized without too much battle 
or resistance. For the first time, in the last while, the downside has become visible and the 
question whether this has been such a beneficial development is being asked. Superficial 
judgments are legally unsatisfactory and not convincing for society. On the other hand it is 
likewise nonsensical and moreover impractical to provide exhaustive motivations for simple 
judgments. The attention to the motivation in simple civil cases does not always stand in 
proportion to the relatively simple importance of the case. “Tailor-made jurisdiction” is 
therefore the device; every case its own depth. 
 
The question of the desirability of a domain enlargement or a domain decrease in “depth” is a 
recurring dilemma for the Dutch Supreme Court. Barendrecht makes some sound remarks on 
this in his De Hoge Raad op de hei (The Supreme Court getting away from it all). A 
distinction must be made between the depth of motivating that the judgments by the Supreme 
Court can make itself and the motivating requirements that the Supreme Court places on the 
lower judges. As far as the judgments of the Supreme Court are concerned the general 
principle that applies is that “the reasons for a judgment (…) (raise) the particular case to a 
more general level”.††††††††††††††††††† For the motivating demands on lower judgments 
generally lower demands are made – in civil cases that the motivation is not incomprehensible 
and does not pass by the essential propositions of the parties – which in particular cases can 
be increased or decreased. “The trick seems to be to adjust the motivation demands so that the 
judge is stimulated to justify in-between steps”, according to Barendrecht, but the extra 
monitoring of the motivation could easily costs hundreds of extra cases per 
year.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  
 
It applies to both the motivations of the Supreme Court itself as well as to the lower judges 
that they should concentrate more on their surroundings, and less on the audience of lawyers 
and fellow colleagues. Judgments of the Supreme Court are caught in a procedural 
straightjacket of appeal resources and the judgments of lower judges are often written to 
survive in a later appeal or review. The result is that they are less comprehensible for the 
parties concerned or society in a broader sense. This has less to do with the use of 
professional jargon than with their choice of audience.§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Witteveen has argued 
for a reorientation of legal transfer, from method consciousness to society consciousness, 
from “context of discovery” and the “context of justification” to the “context of education”. In 
terms of rhetorical theory it will weld the different parts together through interaction with the 
public to a complete whole, and with that dig up new sources of authority.******************** 
That argument can be subscribed to here, with a small adaptation. Among the public sections 
that have to be welded is also that of the professional colleagues and lawyers. The task is thus 
                                                          
††††††††††††††††††† Barendrecht, op.cit., p. 107. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Barendrecht, op.cit., p. 111. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ J.B.M. Vranken & I. Giesen, De Hoge Raad binnenstebuiten: verslag van een experiment, The 
Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2003. 
******************** W. Witteveen, ‘De ontdekking van de rechtsoverdracht: een terreinverkenning’, in: Broers & 
Van Klink 2001, p. 271-289. 
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not to turn away from law making to legal transfer, but to combine both; it has to do with 
combining methods and social consciousness so that the audience of legal colleagues is 
reached as well as the general public audience.  
 
The outline of four possible effects becomes visible for the development of the judge’s 
domain (in qualitative sense: to be understood as the social role of the judge): domain 
enlargement or domain decrease, both wide and deep. Which of these effects is most 
probable, and which is more preferable? The considerations dependent on this are even more 
important than the answer. We will approach these questions in the form of some scenarios 







5. Scenarios for the development of the judge’s domain 
 
In par. 3 a number of social developments were described that have an impact on the judge’s 
domain, in relation to adjacent domains. Some of these developments lead to an enlargement 
of the judicial domain, others to a reduction. This is generally impossible to examine because 
they interface with other developments. Then in par. 4 the social role of the judicial system 
was typified in terms of the judge’s influence and the impact of his judgments. We have 
distinguished between a domain enlargement in “width”, a domain enlargement in “depth”, a 
domain reduction in “width”, and a domain reduction in “depth”. All of this raises the 
question as to what impact the social developments described in par. 3 have on the 
consequences of the role of the judge highlighted in par. 4. What are the most probable 
consequences for the social role of the judiciary as a result of conflicting powers, 
internationalization of the law, the juridification of society, legal cooperation and the 
democratization of the judicial organization? In the Dutch context, do these developments 
lead to a domain enlargement – in “width” or in “depth” – or to a domain reduction, again in 
“width” or “depth”? These are the last questions to be dealt with here. Perhaps it should be 
said in advance that there are no easy monocausal links to be made, the outlined 
developments are far too complex for this. However, what we could do is to try to make some 
believable images, in the form of a few scenarios, on the connections between a number of the 
developments described above. The scenarios that are distinguished here do not have the 
pretension of being anything more or less than that. 
 
Scenario 1: “More, more, more….”; domain enlargement through capacity enlargement 
 
In this scenario the advancing internationalization of the law leads to an increasing 
complexity of the Dutch legal order, its sources and participants. The judicial system sees 
itself confronted with a plurality of legal sources, a proliferation of courts and jurisdictions, 
and an increasing uncertainty of its own task and function. This forces a demarcation to be 
made between its own jurisdiction and that of the international and supranational courts and a 
review of the relationship with the national legislature. The judicial system has the potential to 
position itself as a point of reference for the (European) legal order, as was already observed 
by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). At the same time the juridification of 
society leads to a greater demand on the judicial system, in civil law, criminal law and 
administrative law adjudication. The growing presence of ADR forces the judicial system to 
reflect on its own distinguishing features as a form of dispute settlement, in other words, on 
its public task. Between one thing and another it does not get easier because the authority of 
the judge is continuously under pressure, and every (real or alleged) legal mistake boosts the 
social clamour for transparency and justification. 
 
In this scenario the judicial domain grows simultaneously with the stimulus from the 
surroundings, where distinction must be made between width and depth. In width the judicial 
system aspires to a meaningful social role, for which new instruments are used (legal 
cooperation, directives, combining similar types of cases, striving towards more precedent 
effect etc.). In depth the judicial system strives towards a role in law making, beside that of 
the national legislature and other international or supranational judges. In itself this pursuit is 
compatible with more modest social pretensions. It is not the amount of the share in the social 
demand for justice that counts, but the nature of the share (namely through law making). In 
this way the judicial system can choose to leave a substantial amount of civil dispute 
settlements to ADR, in order to concentrate on its core functions (judicial law making, 
protection of the weaker party, protecting the interests of third parties etc.) 
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This growth scenario – stimulated through efficiency and performance rewards by the judicial 
organization itself – has advantages and disadvantages. It is an advantage that the judicial 
system preserves its central role and develops further, in cohesion with other state powers, 
and national, international and supranational judges (the transnational dialogue between 
judges). With that both crucial interests in society and the legal order are served. At the same 
time the competence and expertise of the judiciary is preserved and grows along with 
developments in society and the legal order. There are a few disadvantages to this. Every offer 
creates a demand and it is for this reason plausible to think that the growth scenario boosts the 
juridification of society. Moreover this leads to higher transaction costs, capacity problems 
and coordination ups and downs in the judiciary and eventually results in a viscous circle of 
control and lawsuits in a growing volume; where does it end? Domain enlargement knows its 
limits, this was also seen in the last section, both in “width” and “depth”. Striving towards 
responsiveness has its limits as to what the judicial system can and cannot do. The judge 
cannot solve all social problems, he is simply not equipped or authorized to do so. 
 
Scenario 2: “Small is beautiful”; domain reduction by withdrawal of the judge 
 
This scenario is conceivable against a background of divergent social developments and legal 
developments in the Netherlands. In the first place it is conceivable that appeals to the judge 
increase, like was described in the first paragraph of the last scenario (more control, rules and 
courts of various origins, juridification, rising demand, democratization, growing criticism). 
Additionally it is also conceivable that domain reduction occurs in the international and 
supranational courts, that through the increased availability of alternative forms of dispute 
settlement a de-juridification occurs, that the demand for law decreases (“implosion of trials”) 
and that through this the judiciary can maintain its capacity and competency to concentrate on 
its core functions. As a result there will be less negative news in the media with the result that 
the confidence in the judicial system improves. It is difficult to predict which way the 
developments will go. But a reaction to both tendencies could be a withdrawal of the judicial 
system, which results in this scenario “small is beautiful”.  
 
The policy of the Balkenende III cabinet is to strive towards a greater responsibility for the 
citizen himself and a repositioning of the judicial system to the “second line”.  This has led to 
certain forms of the administration of justice being allocated to other agencies (PP settlement) 
or to other judges (Mulderizing of criminal cases). Other forms of this “giving back 
responsibilities” are the flash-divorces in family law, the dispensing of planning permission 
for certain types of small renovations, and the greater responsibility of the employee and 
employer to jointly solve their problems in the Gatekeeper Act. Reflection on the need and 
nature of the intervention by the judge is stimulated by these developments; actually why and 
when is an appeal to the judge necessary and desirable? At the same time the vicious circle of 
the growth scenario is broken, with all the advantages from a cost savings point of view. Yet 
there are also risks to domain reduction, what also transpired in the last paragraph. Domain 
reduction in “width” runs the risk of losing relevance, or to say it differently, marginalizing 
the judicial system as a social factor. Will it still be possible in 2015 to settle case after case as 
if the world has not changed? Will the important social questions stay outside the judicial 
system? And would this carefree attitude not lead to a definite “numbing” of the judicial 
system? Domain restriction in “depth” has other risks again. The current discussion on 
unreasoned acquittals and head-and-tail judgments show that reducing the judicial domain in 
this manner entails negative side effects. It leads to negative effects on the persuasiveness of 
judicial decisions and eventually to a negative effect on the competency of the judges 
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themselves. The negligence of lower courts in substantiating their decisions correctly, which 
was brought to light last year by the Advocate-General with the Supreme Court Jörg, is 
ominous of what is to follow.†††††††††††††††††††† The criticism, of a more principled nature, is 
that the retraction by the judge leads to crucial public interests being disregarded, like the 
contribution to law making (“legal loss”), the protection of third parties and weaker parties, 
the control of the administration and politicians, and also the necessary confidence of the 
citizen in the judicial system itself. Domain reduction is a risky scenario, not only from 
society’s point of view and that of the legal order, but also for the judicial system itself.  
 
This theoretical conclusion is supported by empirical research. In its report Toegang tot recht 
(Access to the Law) the Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling (Council for Social 
Development; RMO) has examined in particular the question whether the legal equipment of 
certain groups of citizens is in keeping with the outlined “giving back of 
responsibilities”.‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The research workers concluded, amongst other things on 
the basis of the study into the “dispute settlement delta”§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, that not all citizens 
are able to claim their position in the judicial process. The weak are particularly vulnerable: 
people with little education, with a different cultural background, old people and illiterate 
people. This can have a negative impact, such as social aversion, less participation and 
undesirable forms of taking justice in one’s own hand. In order to prevent these developments 
the Council recommended better access to the law and a better equipping of the citizen, in 
order to, amongst other things, strengthen the problem solving capacity of society (better 
infrastructure for negotiation and dispute settlement, cooperation with legal aid counters and 
social councillors, better positioning of dispute commissions), to strive to a more client 
friendly legal system (better communication, mediation, other approachable forms of dispute 
settlement, better participation of the legal profession in financed legal aid), and the 
promotion of confidence in the legal climate (cheaper, predictable dispensing of justice, 
consistent compliance, depolarization). It remains an open question if these proposals – 
however valuable they may be in themselves – arm the citizen sufficiently against a retracting 
judge. Moreover the proposals imply a certain development of the legal order, more about that 
below. 
 
Finally the impact of domain reduction, with the retraction of the judge, also radiates through 
asylum law. Recently the Raad van State (Council of State) limited its criteria test for 
granting asylum arrangements to the vital questions – the credibility of the asylum seeker’s 
declarations and the risks in returning – to a marginal test. In terms of the administration’s 
expertise and the complexity of the test the Council of State is taking a step backwards from 
the full test done by the Council and lower judges before 2001 to marginal testing now. That 
is a domain reduction in another sense of the word; not only through a restriction to the case 
at hand (in width), or through superficial motivation (in depth), but through a combination of 
both: through a restriction on the scope of the review resulting in a domain reduction for the 
administration. Recently Essakkili and Spijkerboer asked themselves if this development fits 
in a broader trend of a withdrawal of the administrative judge. The domain enlargement of the 
administrative judicial system in the seventies and eighties, as a counterbalance to advancing 
government authorities, seems to be going in the opposite direction now. “It seems that 
                                                          
†††††††††††††††††††† Conclusion of the A-G at HR January 25th, NJ 2006, 411. See also ‘Rechters maken te veel 
fouten’, NRC Handelsblad, January 29th 2005. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ RMO, Toegang tot recht, advice 32, The Hague, December 2004. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Rapport Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2003. See also N.J.H. Huls, with the cooperation of A. Klijn, 
Over rechtshulpgolven en andere dingen die voorbijgaan…, Leiden, 2004, available at http://www.adviesorgaan-
rmo.nl/downloads/standard/Onderzoek%20Rechtshulpgolven.pdf, and ‘Over rechtshulpgolven. De 
geschilbeslechtingsdelta en juridische problemen’, NJB, 2005, p. 1-17. 
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thorough legal protection from government authorities was particularly necessary in a time of 
social democratic revamping when interventionist government was being constructed. Now 
that the government is more neo-liberal and is said to be withdrawing, it apparently earns 
more confidence and an active administrative judge is seen less as a useful counterbalance 
and more as a burden.”*********************  
 
Scenario 3: “Not more or less, but different”; domain movement through reappraisal of the 
judicial system’s role 
 
A different choice for the role of the judicial system can be made from the same social 
background as described just above; not more or less, but different. In line with the last 
paragraph this could be a development in “width”, or a development in “depth”. For domain 
enlargement or reduction in “width” considerations of the judge’s social role are of 
importance. In this domain movement the (first) paradigm of the judge’s domain as a work 
terrain is recognizable. Of course it is not exclusively the width of individual judgments that 
counts but rather the social access of the judicial system. Considerations such as relevance 
and responsiveness are central, how relevant does the judiciary want to be for social 
developments? To what extent does it want to give an answer to social needs and 
requirements? And what price is it willing to pay for this, taking into consideration the 
restrictions that go with it? More security through criminal law, or preferably no further 
damage to individual freedom rights? More ADR instead of civil law adjudication, or more 
protection for the weaker party? A more decisive administration, or one that holds on tight to 
the citizen’s legal protection? A relevant and responsive legal system is important, but it can 
become strained because of the consideration it has to give to the rule of law that the judicial 
system also serves.  
 
For domain enlargement or reduction in depth, considerations of particular importance are 
those surrounding the role played by the judge in the rule of law. In this domain movement 
the (second) paradigm of the domain as the role played by the judge is recognized. Here too it 
is not the depth of the motivation of individual judgments that is central, but the degree to 
which the judicial system contributes to law making. Central to this therefore are 
considerations around the public function of the judge; what is his contribution to law 
making? What public interests are served by the involvement of the judge compared to other 
dispute settlers for example?††††††††††††††††††††† How does the contribution of the judge to law 
making compare to that of other state powers like the legislature? Do we choose for a strong 
judicial system with a clear role in law making and with that the maintenance of the legal 
order? Or does the judge step back in favor of the national legislature, the international and 
supranational treaty legislature, or international and supranational courts? Of course the 
internationalization of our law has left its mark, but where do we ultimately want the center of 
the law making to lie? There are good reasons to plead for a strong role for the Dutch judicial 
system, of course in transnational dialogue with other (international or supranational) judges 
abroad and one of the reasons for this is – besides the classic advantages of judicial 
development of the legal order with “case by case” situations – the preservation of national 
input into law making. A strong role for the national judge as an anchor point in the different 
legal orders that our legal order forms a part of would serve the national interest. For this 
reason the judge should not hasten to give up his role in the legal order. 
 
                                                          
********************* S. Essakkili & T.P. Spijkerboer, ‘De marginale toetsing in asielzaken’, NJB 2006, p. 1882-
1889, here p. 1889. 




6. A few conclusions 
 
The analysis in the light of models presented in American academic writing has resulted in some 
conclusions and additions with respect to the role of the Dutch judicial system in 2015. These 
conclusions may be transferable to discussions on judicial organization in other European legal 
systems, when taking into account the specificities of the legal culture of each system. 
Conclusions 1-9 are related to the social meaning of the judicial system, and 9-14 are related to 
its constitutional meaning (although the one cannot be strictly separated from the other). The last 
conclusion, 15, is of an organizational nature:  
 
1. Two paradigms must be distinguished in order to think and speak about the judicial 
system’s domain. In the quantitative paradigm the judicial system’s domain is seen as its 
work terrain, in the qualitative paradigm as its role. We should be careful not to talk and 
think of the judicial system only in terms of social meaning, but also in terms of its 
meaning for the rule of law; 
 
2. The judicial system’s domain will continue to grow in the short-term in the Netherlands, 
especially for administrative law cases and appeal cases. This development is not at all 
what was expected based on the long-term developments. Despite the extra attention for 
security no growth in the amount of criminal law cases, despite the withdrawal of the 
administrative court no cases less, and despite the rise in mediation no civil cases less. 
The growth of the judicial system’s domain seems to be a relatively autonomous 
development. It seems in the US – other than what the “litigation explosion” legend 
would have one expect – since the start of the sixties there has actually been a fall in the 
amount of proceedings (“implosion of trials”); 
 
3. The developments in the long-term that we discussed here – conflicting powers, 
internationalization, juridification, legal cooperation and democratization – all have both a 
domain enlargement as well as a domain reduction impact. The influence of the judicial 
system and the impact of judicial decisions can be described in terms of domain 
enlargement or reduction, both in “width” and “depth”. Domain developments in civil 
law, criminal law and administrative law can be analyzed in these terms. After a continual 
domain enlargement up to the eighties – both in width and depth – it seems that after this 
there was a domain reduction for some parts; 
 
4. The development of the judicial system should neither be determined by an uncontrolled 
social growth (scenario 1), nor by ideological assumptions (scenario 2), but by a clever 
strategic response to changing circumstances (scenario 3). More than the first two 
scenarios, scenario 3 is based on a reflection of the role of the judicial system (the 
qualitative paradigm) and deserves preference for this reason; 
 
5. The judicial system should be so wide that it is socially relevant and responsive (or 
remains that way), but not so wide that it surrenders its fundamental legal goods. The 
balance will have to be found from case to case (compare the discussion about the 
criminal judge and security, the civil judge and the protection of the weaker party, and the 
administrative judge in relation to decisive administration); 
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6. Considering its social role the withdrawal of the judicial system to “the second line” is 
more limited than is often thought. Sometimes it is the interests of the justice seekers (loss 
of legal protection) that resist, other times the interests of the legal order (loss of law 
making), and then again sometimes the interest of the judicial organization (loss of 
competence);   
 
7. Settlement of bulk cases cannot be completely delegated (compare the Mulderizing of 
criminal cases, PP settlements, flash divorces), without losing out on another front. In the 
general practitioner’s cases (work, housing, income) the few contacts that the individual 
citizen has with the judicial system are often the only source of confidence and 
legitimacy; 
  
8. Complex cases, even more than bulk cases, cannot be completely delegated (compare 
agreement arbitration, ad hoc commissions, and other dispute settlers). The settlement of 
such cases often contributes to truth finding (as in the Enschedé and Volendam cases), 
law making (“wrongful birth”, “wrongful life”), public justification proceedings, the 
social debate, and – “last but not least” – the competency of the judiciary itself; 
 
9. The judicial system should preserve a recognizable profile in the legal order as a state 
power that makes binding judgments (no pseudo lawmaker or controller). The core 
components of its task should (continue to) contain the utilization of the principle of 
audite et alteram partem, truth finding, forming judgments, the substantiation and the 
pronouncement of  judgments, and the execution of judicial decisions; 
 
10. The judge must substantiate judgments deeply enough for a (continued) contribution to 
the legal order. This implies a necessity for balance to be found between the many 
common simple cases (wide judgments), and the rare complex judgments (deep 
judgments). Besides, the boundaries of the law making task of the judge must be kept in 
mind, both in relation to the other judges (in future cases) and in relation to the law 
makers (legislature);  
 
11. The practice of unsubstantiated acquittals and judgments should be abandoned. Not only 
do such judgments not contribute to law making, they leave justice seekers and society in 
uncertainty about the reasons that underlie the forming of a judgment;  
 
12. The judicial system must strive towards a more interactive and communicative attitude. 
To this end it must not only aim at professional colleagues and lawyers, but also to parties 
of lawsuits and the general public (law-finding and transfer of law). It is of vital 
importance for the authority of the judicial system that it succeeds in integrating both 
forums in an acceptance of and an understanding for the judicial system;  
 
13. The judicial system must strive for a crucial role as a point of reference for the 
international and European legal order, that is to say, a role where it is in a position to 
both contribute to the law making of international and European law, as well as the 
impact that has on Dutch law; 
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14. The judicial system should contribute, in its law-making task, to a permanent reappraisal 
of the legal order and renewal of the law, and with that to the normative structure of 
society. Through its unique position it is, more, properly equipped and legitimized than 
any social institution to do this;  
 
15. Reinforcement of the judicial organization is necessary in order for it to (continue to) 
fulfil its social role and rule of law role, within the constitutional framework for the 
judicial organization. Thereby the balance should be kept between on the one hand the 
demands of a human scale and a recognizable judicial map, and on the other hand quality 
improvement and increase in efficiency. Guiding trends are specialization through 
concentration, region forming and legal cooperation. In the long run a development in the 
direction of functional jurisdictions, administrative integration and expansion of scale is 
inevitable. 
 
 
 
